Pay Per Click: Keyword Advertising and the Search for Limitations of Online Trademark Infringement Liability by Watson, Thomas H.
101 
PAY PER CLICK: KEYWORD 
ADVERTISING AND THE SEARCH FOR 
LIMITATIONS OF ONLINE 
TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT 
LIABILITY  
Search engines, led by the world’s most prominent search en-
gines, led by the world’s most prominent search engine, Google,
INTRODUCTION 
1
Google and other search engines are able to provide these and 
many more services to users free of charge because they generate sub-
stantial revenues from their online advertising services. Google’s 
AdWords program is the largest and most successful of these services, 
producing over $21 billion in total advertising revenues in 2008.
 are 
revolutionizing the way that the general public accesses all types of 
information and content. These free and efficient entities link con-
sumers to specifically desired information within the unquantifiable 
wealth of information available on the Internet. Search engines are the 
key intermediaries that allow consumers to quickly and easily find 
desired information online, without which the process would be akin 
to finding a needle in a haystack. In addition to providing links to con-
tent hosted by third parties, Google also provides direct access on its 
own site to otherwise largely unavailable content and information. For 
instance, the Google Books program gives users free access to digi-
tized copies of millions of books scanned by Google and its partners. 
And Google Maps allows users to search a highly detailed map of the 
world for the location of the nearest Starbucks or for directions to a 
friend’s house, among many other helpful features.  
2
  
 1 Because of Google’s unrivaled position in the search engine and keyword 
advertising market, this Note will specifically discuss Google’s keyword advertising 
programs, and omit any specific discussion of programs offered by other competing 
search engines, like Yahoo! However, the law and analysis should apply equally to all 
of the various keyword advertising programs offered by search engines and other 
intermediaries. 
 2 2008 Financial Tables: Investor Relations, GOOGLE, http://investor. 
google.com/financial/2008/tables.html (last visited Jan., 3 2011); see also Inside the 
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sentially, Google sells advertisements based on the keywords searched 
by users. An advertiser purchases a keyword from Google and pays a 
price each time a user who searched for that keyword clicks on the 
advertiser’s ad, which is displayed in a “Sponsored Links” section 
usually to the right or above the “organic” or “natural” search results.3 
For example, if “Joe’s Pizza” wants to advertise its pizza shop online, 
it can register for a Google AdWords account and then bid on a price 
per click for the keyword “pizza.”4 Now, if a user runs a Google 
search for “pizza,” Joe’s Pizza’s advertisement would be displayed in 
the sponsored links section of the search results page.5
Google’s advertising programs significantly benefit all parties in-
volved. Google generates large revenues to fund its diverse business 
operations. Advertisers can reach a larger and more diverse audience 
and are also able to more specifically and accurately target potential 
customers than was possible through traditional marketing methods, 
such as phone book, newspaper, or radio advertisements. Consumers 
also benefit in numerous ways. They are presented with more options 
for purchasing the goods or services they seek than they would be if 
only the organic search results were displayed because the organic 




(explaining that Google’s AdWords program brought in $4 billion in profits (95% of 
total profits) in 2008). 
 3 See Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., No. 1:04CV507, 2005 WL 
1903128, at *2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 8, 2005) (explaining how the Google AdWords pro-
gram works). 
 4 See AdWords Help: What is Google AdWords?, GOOGLE, https://adwords. 
google.com/support/aw/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=6084 (last visited Jan., 3 
 2011); Inside the Mind of Google, supra note 2. 
 5 The placement of an advertiser’s ad within the Sponsored Links section 
depends on a number of factors, including the price paid per click, how relevant the 
target site is to the searched term, etc. The advertiser can also control when it wants 
its ad displayed, choosing for instance to display its ad based on the time of day that 
the term is searched for or on the location of the searcher. See AdWords Help: What is 
Google AdWords?, supra note 4; Inside the Mind of Google, supra note 2. 
 6 See Inside the Mind of Google, supra note 2 (explaining how Google’s 
algorithms naturally rank sites based on the number of links to and from a site, and 
therefore generally rank more established businesses higher than smaller businesses 
with less of an online presence). 
 For instance, 
if the consumer was again searching for “pizza” and was only given 
the organic results of his search (without the different sponsored links) 
he would likely see only large pizza chains at the top of his results, 
like Domino’s or Pizza Hut. The use of keyword advertising allows a 
small shop, like Joe’s Pizza, to display its website under the sponsored 
links heading along with the larger shops. This gives the consumer 
more choices when purchasing and allows him more easily to com-
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pare the prices and products that he desires to purchase. Consumers 
also indirectly benefit from the use of keyword advertising programs 
which fund the search engines’ businesses and, in turn, provide the 
many beneficial products and services free of charge to the public. 
Of course, without some way for search engines to generate reve-
nue, the free services they provide to the public would not be possible 
and thus, search engines have to charge advertisers for the use of 
keywords.7
This Note analyzes the practice of buying and selling trademarks 
as keywords that trigger advertisements to illustrate why courts have 
struggled to come to consistent results. Essentially, because trademark 
law originally dealt with much simpler issues, its basic doctrines do 
not provide a clear resolution to the problem presented. This Note 
proposes a legislative solution, namely the creation of a statutory safe 
harbor to shield search engines and online advertisers from liability 
for the sale of certain nondeceptive advertisements triggered by tra-
demarked keywords. Part I discusses some fundamentals of trademark 
law. Part II analyzes a variety of cases in which courts have dealt with 
trademark disputes on the Internet, and specifically disputes over the 
 Despite these benefits to consumers and advertisers, a 
potential trademark problem arises when the keyword purchased by 
an advertiser is a registered trademark of another company. Regarding 
the “Joe’s Pizza” example, assume Joe’s bought the keyword “Pizza 
Hut,” so that whenever a user searched for “Pizza Hut,” along with a 
link to Pizza Hut’s website, an advertisement for Joe’s Pizza would 
also be displayed in the sponsored links section of the results page. 
This practice is fairly common for obvious reasons. Keyword adver-
tising allows advertisers to very specifically identify and target poten-
tial customers based on the keywords they commonly enter. If the 
keyword “pizza” is effective at identifying a potential customer of 
Joe’s Pizza, it is easy to see why the keyword “Pizza Hut” would also 
be an effective identifier. Joe’s Pizza generally offers the same servic-
es as Pizza Hut, so perhaps the user would be interested in buying 
pizza from Joe’s instead of from Pizza Hut. In recent years, this type 
of keyword advertising—where an advertiser buys a registered trade-
mark of a competitor as a searchable keyword—has spawned litiga-
tion throughout the country. Courts have struggled to apply the prin-
ciples of trademark law to these disputes and have come to a variety 
of inconsistent conclusions about whether the practice is legal, and if 
not, who should be liable—the search engine or the advertiser.  
  
 7 Google charges advertisers in the AdWords program a price per click. 
Thus, advertisers pay nothing to have their ad displayed (what Google refers to as an 
“impression”), and instead only pay when a user clicks on the ad. See AdWords Help: 
What is Google AdWords?, supra note 4; Inside the Mind of Google, supra note 2. 
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sale and purchase of trademarks as keywords that trigger the display 
of advertisements. Part III discusses the scholarly reactions to what 
many see as the overprotection of trademarks on the Internet at the 
expense of consumers and shows why the solutions advocated are not 
optimal. Part IV proposes a more manageable solution to the problem 
in the form of a legislative safe harbor that classifies certain uses of 
trademarks as keywords as nondeceptive—that is, as conclusively not 
likely to confuse consumers—and therefore shields search engines 
and online advertisers from liability for the purchase and sale of the 
trademarks as keywords. 
I. THE NORMATIVE FOUNDATIONS OF TRADEMARK 
LAW 
The normative goal of trademark law is to produce better-
informed consumers.8 To serve this goal, trademark law attempts to 
foster the flow of commercial information in markets by protecting 
against deceptive and inaccurate uses of trade symbols. By protecting 
trademarks, the law allows merchants to develop reliable shorthand 
identifications of their goods and services. This shorthand serves con-
sumers because it lowers their search costs.9
  
 8 Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search 
Costs on the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 782 (2004) [hereinafter Dogan & Lem-
ley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs] (arguing how overly expansive protec-
tion of trademark rights “conflicts with…[trademark law’s] normative goal of produc-
ing better-informed consumers”). 
 9 See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1995) (“In 
principle, trademark law, by preventing others from copying a source-identifying 
mark, ‘reduce[s] the customer’s costs of shopping and making purchasing decisions,’ 
for it quickly and easily assures a potential customer that this item—the item with this 
mark—is made by the same producer as other similarly marked items that he or she 
liked (or disliked) in the past. At the same time, the law helps assure a producer that it 
(and not an imitating competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-related rewards 
associated with a desirable product. The law thereby ‘encourage[s] the production of 
quality products,’ and simultaneously discourages those who hope to sell inferior 
products by capitalizing on a consumer’s inability quickly to evaluate the quality of 
an item offered for sale.”) (citation omitted); Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 510 
(7th Cir. 2002) (“The fundamental purpose of a trademark is to reduce consumer 
search costs by providing a concise and unequivocal identifier of the particular source 
of particular goods.”); Dogan & Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs, 
supra note 8, at 778. 
 If a consumer has pur-
chased and enjoyed a product from Brand X, she can repurchase the 
product quickly and easily if she can rely on Brand X’s trademarks as 
source identifiers for its products. The consumer does not have to per-
form any further research into the product to determine that it is the 
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product he seeks. Thus, trademark law ideally results in better-
informed consumers and more competitive markets.10
However, the overprotection of trademark rights may lead to con-
trary results. If trademark holders are allowed to exercise their trade-
mark rights to prevent the use of their marks in criticisms of their 
products or services or in comparisons of those products or services to 
competitors’ products or services, trademark law would in effect be 
suppressing valuable information that is critical to an informed con-
sumer and a functioning market.
  
11 To avoid overprotection, trademark 
law incorporates various rules to limit the scope of protection of 
trademark holders’ rights. For instance, the controlling statute, com-
monly known as the Lanham Act, exempts truthful comparative ad-
vertising from suit for infringement,12 and requires that the use of a 
trademark by a defendant in an infringement suit be likely to cause 
confusion in order to incur liability.13 In the Internet context, the most 
important and controversial limitation imposed by trademark law to 
limit the scope of trademark holders’ rights requires that a defendant 
use a mark in connection with goods or services to infringe.14
Despite these protections against the anticompetitive overprotec-
tion of trademarks, recent developments in trademark law have wea-
kened these rules to the point that the information-facilitating goal of 




 10 Dogan & Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs, supra note 8, 
at 778 (“[Trademark] law enables sellers to create their own reliable shorthand to 
identify their goods and reduces search costs for consumers. Trademarks thus have 
the potential to lead to better-informed customers and more competitive markets.”) 
(citing Perryman, 306 F.3d at 510 (explaining how trademarks contribute to consum-
er savvy and affect market choices)). 
 11 Id. 
 12 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2006) (allowing the good faith use of “descrip-
tive” terms as a defense to an infringement claim); Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 
562, 569 (9th Cir. 1968) (holding that “in the absence of misrepresentation or confu-
sion as to source or sponsorship a seller in promoting his own goods may use the 
trademark of another to identify the latter’s goods”). 
 13 §§ 1114(1), 1125(a)(1). 
 14 See §§ 1114(1), 1125(a)(1) (limiting cause of action for trademark in-
fringement to uses “in connection with” the sale or offering of goods or services “in 
commerce”); see also 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 412 
(2d Cir. 2005) (noting the three distinct elements of an infringement claim: “use,” “in 
commerce,” and “likelihood of confusion”); DaimlerChrysler AG v. Bloom, 315 F.3d 
932, 936, 936-39 (8th Cir. 2003) (concluding that use of telephone number that trans-
lated into 1-800-MERCEDES did not constitute “use” of the mark for purposes of the 
Lanham Act when defendant “only licensed the phone number but did not advertise 
or promote Mercedes’ protected marks”). 
 This Note examines the erosion and 
 15 See Dogan & Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs, supra 
note 8, at 777 (“In the online context, in particular, some courts have recently allowed 
trademark holders to block uses of their marks that would never have raised an eye-
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misapplication of these requirements by courts in cases involving in-
fringement suits against Internet search engines for their sale of 
trademarks as searchable keywords. In these cases, trademark holders 
sue search engines directly for infringement because the search engine 
has sold the plaintiff’s trademark as a keyword to a third party, usual-
ly a competitor of the trademark holder. The result is that when a user 
searches for the trademark, the competitor’s advertisement shows up 
in a “Sponsored Links” section on the search results page. For exam-
ple, if a user is looking for a Valvoline location to have his oil 
changed, he could run a Google search for “Valvoline.” If Jiffy Lube, 
a Valvoline competitor, has purchased the Valvoline trademark as a 
searchable keyword through Google’s AdWords program, then the 
search results presented to the user would show Valvoline’s website in 
the natural search results section, but also, in a “Sponsored Links” 
section, an advertisement for Jiffy Lube’s competing services. 
A. The Lowering of Consumer Search Costs as the Fundamental 
Normative Goal of Trademark Law 
Trademark scholars widely agree that the goal of trademark law is 
to improve the quality of information available to consumers in the 
marketplace and thereby reduce consumer search costs.16
  
brow in a brick-and-mortar setting—uses that increase, rather than diminish, the flow 
of truthful, relevant information to consumers.”); Margreth Barrett, Internet Trade-
mark Suits and the Demise of “Trademark Use,” 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 371, 373 
(2006) (“A number of courts and commentator have warned against the dangers of 
expanding the rights of trademark owners, both from the standpoint of efficient mar-
ketplace competition and from the standpoint of First Amendment interests. Others 
have expressed concerns, in particular, about the apparent expansion of trademark 
rights in the Internet setting.”) (footnotes omitted).  
 16 See, e.g., Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark 
Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1844 (2007) [hereinafter McKenna, Normative 
Foundations] (“It would be difficult to overstate the level of consensus among com-
mentators that the goal of trademark law is—and always has been—to improve the 
quality of information in the marketplace and thereby reduce consumer search 
costs.”). But see, Dogan & Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs, supra 
note 8, at 799-801 (discussing alternatives to the search cost rationale for trademark 
law). 
 That trade-
marks reduce consumer search costs is evident by a simple example. 
Suppose, for instance, that you enjoy Gatorade, the flavored, noncar-
bonated sports drink manufactured by Quaker Oats. If Quaker Oats 
did not use the trademarked brand name “Gatorade” to identify this 
product, then to order it a consumer would have to request “the fla-
vored, noncarbonated sports drink made by Quaker Oats,” instead of 
just being able to request it by its trade name. This would take longer 
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to say, would require the consumer to remember more about the prod-
uct, and require the same of the store clerk from whom it was re-
quested.17 Using the brand name “Gatorade” decreases the amount of 
information that both the consumer and the salesman need to remem-
ber about the product in order to complete the transaction. Thus, the 
benefit of trademarks is analogous to the use of both a first and last 
name and initials to identify a person, so that instead of having to say 
“the president who came after Bill Clinton, not the one who came 
before him,” you can identify “George W. Bush, not George H.W. 
Bush.”18
Trademark law serves the goal of reducing consumer search costs 
by protecting the meaning behind the shorthand symbols (trademarks) 
that identify information about products and services sold in the mar-
ketplace. Thus, by protecting the meaning of these symbols, trade-
mark law protects consumers in two ways. First, it protects consumers 
from being deceived into purchasing goods or services they do not 
desire. Second, it allows consumers to rely on the shorthand symbols 
as identifiers of the products and services with which they are famili-
ar. Consumers then make decisions whether or not to purchase those 
products based on those symbols, thereby reducing the costs involved 
in searching for products in the marketplace.
 
19
To serve its goal of reducing consumer search costs, trademark 
law must ensure that trademarks are not duplicated or otherwise in-
fringed upon and that a single trademark serves as faithful shorthand 
for only one product or service. To allow multiple products to be sold 
under the same trademark would destroy the benefit created by use of 




 17 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Eco-
nomic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 268-69 (1987) (providing a similar exam-
ple). 
 18 See id. at 269 (providing a similar example). 
 19 See id. at 269 (“[A] trademark conveys information that allows the con-
sumer to say to himself, ‘I need not investigate the attributes of the brand I am about 
to purchase because the trademark is a shorthand way of telling me that the attributes 
are the same as that of the brand I enjoyed earlier.’”); McKenna, Normative Founda-
tions, supra note 16, at 1844 (“By preserving the integrity of these symbols, trade-
mark law benefits consumers in both a narrow sense (by protecting them from being 
deceived into buying products they do not want) and a broad sense (by allowing con-
sumers to rely on source indicators generally and thereby reducing the costs of 
searching for products in the market).”) (footnote omitted). 
 20 See Landes & Posner, supra note 17, at 269 (describing the market effects 
of allowing duplication of a trademark or brand name). 
 Thus, trademark law has 
stringent registration requirements defining the type of use required in 
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order for the law to protect a trademark.21 Once recognized and pro-
tected by the law, trademarks work only if consumers can trust their 
accuracy, so the law protects established trademarks from confusing 
imitations or duplicates.22 This protection ensures that both consumers 
and producers can rely on trademarks as accurate vocabulary for 
communications between them.23 Both the buyers and the sellers ben-
efit from being able to trust trademark vocabulary as reliable short-
hand for the products or services being transacted.24 Sellers benefit 
from being able to invest resources in the goodwill created by the 
product and its mark, and buyers benefit because they do not have to 
repeat research every time they desire to purchase the product.25 This 
understanding of trademark law has led some scholars to characterize 
its aim as the promotion of truthful competition in the marketplace 
through the assurance of the accuracy and clarity of the language of 
trade.26
While the right amount of protection of trademarks can stimulate 
competition and provide benefits to consumers and producers alike, 
the overprotection of trademarks has the potential to harm competition 
rather than to facilitate it.
 
B. The Dangers of the Overprotection of Trademarks 
27 Overprotecting trademarks may be anti-
competitive because it may allow mark owners “to erect substantial 
barriers to competition.”28
  
 21 See generally 15 U.S.C. §§1051-1072 (2006) (statutory registration re-
quirements). 
 22 See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125 (providing grounds for civil liabili-
ty for trademark infringement). 
 23 See Dogan & Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs, supra 
note 8, at 787 (“[The trademark law] system works, of course, only if consumers can 
trust the accuracy of trademarks, and this is where the law comes in. By protecting 
established trademarks against confusing imitation, the law ensures a reliable vocabu-
lary for communications between producers and consumers.”). 
 24 Id. (“Both sellers and buyers benefit from the ability to trust this vocabu-
lary to mean what it says it means.”). 
 25 Id. at 788-89.  
 26 Id. at 789 (“Trademark law, in other words, aims to promote rigorous, 
truthful competition in the marketplace by preserving the clarity of the language of 
trade.”). 
 27 See Barrett, supra note 15, at 450 (explaining the potential anticompetitive 
effects of the overprotection of trademarks); Dogan & Lemley, Trademarks and Con-
sumer Search Costs, supra note 8, at 778 (discussing the harmful effects of the over-
protection of trademarks). 
 28 Barrett, supra note 15, at 450. 
 Properly formulated, trademark law bal-
ances the interests of trademark owners and consumers to reduce con-
sumer search costs by prohibiting deceptive uses, which increase 
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search costs, while permitting other uses that facilitate the flow of 
truthful and useful information to consumers.29 For example, trade-
mark law traditionally allows the use of another’s mark to critique or 
compare the mark owner’s products because these uses are not decep-
tive and provide valuable information to consumers about the mark 
owners’ products in the form of comparable products and services or 
critiques of the owner’s products.30
Overprotection of trademarks can upset the balance by suppress-
ing this type of information which is essential to consumers in a prop-
erly functioning market.
  
31 It can further hurt competition in the mar-
ketplace by allowing trademark owners to use litigation and the threat 
of litigation as a weapon against potential competitors, thus negatively 
affecting the marketing of new competing products.32 Some commen-
tators have noted the potential of harm to First Amendment interests 
that can also result from the overprotection of trademark rights.33
  
 29 Id. (“[T]rademark law strikes a careful balance to ensure that genuinely 
deceptive (and more recently, dilutive) uses of marks, which increase consumer 
search costs, are prohibited, while uses to critique or compare the mark owners’s [sic] 
products and thus enhance the flow of useful information to consumers are permit-
ted.”). 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. (“Overprotection…lead[s] to the suppression of information essential 
to a properly functioning market.”) (footnote omitted); see also Dogan & Lemley, 
Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs, supra note 8, at 778 (“If trademark holders 
were allowed, say, to prevent the use of their marks to critique the trademark holders’ 
products or to compare them to others, trademarks would become tools for suppress-
ing information that is critical to a functioning market.”). 
 32 See Barrett, supra note 15, at 450 (“Threats of lawsuits to enforce ‘proper-
ty like’ trademark rights may also provide a potent weapon against commercial com-
petitors, disrupting the marketing of new, competing products.”) (footnote omitted); 
see also Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertis-
ing Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717, 1730 n.77 (1999) (“Extending enhanced legal protec-
tion to trade symbols imposes significant costs of its own. If we put to one side the 
expense involved in judicial resolution of trademark law disputes, we still need to 
confront the fact that litigation over trade symbols and advertising can be a powerful 
weapon to deploy against a commercial competitor. Wielded with skill, it can accom-
plish delay in the introduction of promising new products, the abandonment of effec-
tive advertising campaigns, massive expenditures on legal counsel, and persistent 
impediments to securing favorable financing. Where products seem roughly competi-
tive, a little well-placed litigation can tilt the playing field.”). 
 33 See Barrett, supra note 15, at 450-51. 
 The 
argument is that because trademarks serve such a significant role in 
our discourse as reliable shorthand, not only for individual products 
but also as metaphors and images that are vividly representative of 
non-commercial ideas, allowing trademark owners to overly restrict 
their use can harm the public’s interest in free and open communica-
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tion.34 Finally, in the Internet context, overprotection of marks is par-
ticularly troublesome because the problems of overprotection are 
compounded with the danger of interfering with the development of 
efficient search and marketing technologies that will ultimately foster 
a more competitive market and further lower consumer search costs.35
Much has been written about the perceived problems of the ex-
pansion of trademark rights at the expense of consumers in a variety 
of Internet contexts.
 
II. TRADEMARK LAW AND ONLINE MARKETING: 
THE PROBLEM OF TRADEMARK-BASED KEYWORD 
ADVERTISEMENTS 
36 Because of the rapid development and evolu-
tion of the Internet, courts have struggled to define the boundaries of 
trademark infringement online. Each time courts appear to reach a 
consensus for analyzing trademark disputes in a certain type of online 
practice, the practice becomes somewhat obsolete and a new tech-
nique for marketing one’s goods and services is developed. Early 
practices that implicated trademark concerns on the Internet include: 
cybersquatting, where an individual registers a domain name consist-
ing of another’s trademark before the trademark owner registers it and 
then ultimately sells the domain to the mark owner for a substantial 
profit;37
  
 34 See Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 972-
73 (1993) (“[T]rademarks play a significant role in our public discourse. They often 
provide some of our most vivid metaphors, as well as the most compelling imagery in 
political campaigns. Some ideas—’it’s the Rolls Royce of its class,’ for example—are 
difficult to express any other way. That’s no accident. Trademarks are often selected 
for their effervescent qualities, and then injected into the stream of communication 
with the pressure of a firehose by means of mass media campaigns. Where trademarks 
come to carry so much communicative freight, allowing the trademark holder to re-
strict their use implicates our collective interest in free and open communication.”); 
see generally Pierre N. Leval, Trademark: Champion of Free Speech, 27 COLUM. J.L. 
& ARTS 187 (2004) (providing background information regarding the interplay be-
tween trademark protection and First Amendment interests).  
 35 Barrett, supra note 15, at 452; see also Dogan & Lemley, Trademarks and 
Consumer Search Costs, supra note 8, at 831 (discussing concern that overprotection 
of trademarks in the Internet context has the potential to negatively affect the devel-
opment of efficient search technology and other new methods of advertising that will 
decrease consumer search costs); Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet 
Trademark Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 507, 509 (2005) (“Without limits, trademark law has 
the capacity to counterproductively destroy the Internet’s utility for everyone.”). 
 36 See generally Barrett, supra note 15; Dogan & Lemley, Trademarks and 
Consumer Search Costs, supra note 8; Goldman, supra note 35. 
 37 See Barrett, supra note 15, at 396 (discussing the phenomenon of cybers-
quatting). 
 and metatagging, where an individual uses another’s trade-
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marks in the text of his website’s metatags in order to be listed as a 
search result when a user searched for the trademark.38
Online marketing practices have evolved rapidly to the point that 
metatagging and cybersquatting are now basically obsolete.
  
39 Today, 
the most significant Internet marketing tools are the keyword adver-
tisement programs offered by a variety of search engines, most nota-
bly Google AdWords.40 Accompanying its rise in significance has 
been litigation of trademark infringement disputes arising from 
Google’s sale of trademarks as searchable keywords.41 Further com-
plicating the matter is that Google offers another program, its Key-
word Suggestion Tool, that works in tandem with its AdWords pro-
gram to suggest to advertisers which keywords to purchase, including 
trademarks owned by competitors.42 This program improves the effec-
tiveness of advertising by helping advertisers identify which keywords 
are most likely to place their advertisements before interested users.43 
Several questions arise in these cases, but the question most vexing to 
courts thus far has been whether the suggestion, sale, and purchase of 
a trademark as a searchable keyword by Google or by the advertiser 
constitutes a “use in commerce” sufficient for infringement liability.44
Congress codified United States trademark law in the Trademark 
Act of 1946, which is commonly known as the Lanham Act.
 
A. The Debate Over the Requirement of a “Use In Commerce” For 
Trademark Infringement Liability 
45
  
 38 See id. at 423-24 (“Metatags consist of HTML code integrated into a web-
site, which is invisible to website visitors but can be read by search engines. The 
metatags are meant to communicate the contents of a website to Internet search en-
gines by means of a short description and ‘keywords.’”) (footnote omitted). 
 39 Congress enacted legislation to specifically combat cybersquatting. See 15 
U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2006). Further, search engines no longer rely on metatags in formu-
lating search results. Barrett, supra note 15, at 424. 
 40 AdWords produced over $21 billion in total revenues for Google in 2008. 
2008 Financial Tables: Investor Relations, supra note 2. 
 41 See, e.g., Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 562 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2009); 
Soilworks, LLC v. Midwest Indus. Supply, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 2d 1118 (D. Ariz. 
2008); Boston Duck Tours, LP v. Super Duck Tours, LLC, 527 F. Supp. 2d 205 (D. 
Mass. 2007), rev’d in part on other grounds, 531 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2008); Buying For 
the Home, LLC v. Humble Abode, LLC, 459 F. Supp. 2d 310 (D. N.J. 2006); Google, 
Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper Factory, Inc., No. C 03-05340 JF, 2005 WL 832398 
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2005); Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700 
(E.D. Va. 2004). 
 42 See Rescuecom, 562 F.3d at 126. 
 43 Id.  
 44 See id. at 127-31 (discussing whether Google’s sale of a trademarked 
keyword constitutes a “use in commerce” sufficient for infringement liability). 
 45 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1141 (2006). 
 The 
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infringement provisions are located in sections 3246 and 43.47 Section 
32 imposes liability on anyone who “without the consent of the regi-
strant … use[s] in commerce any reproduction … [or] copy … of a 
registered mark … in connection with which such use is likely to 
cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.”48 Section 43 im-
poses liability on “[a]ny person who, on or in connection with any 
goods or services,… uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, 
or device … which … is likely to cause confusion.”49 Thus, the initial 
issue litigated in many of the keyword advertisement cases has been 
whether Google’s suggestion and sale, or an advertiser’s purchase, of 
a trademark as a keyword meets this “use in commerce” require-
ment.50 Only if this requirement is met will a court then analyze 
whether the use of the trademark was likely to confuse consumers, 
and was therefore an infringing use.51
Courts and scholars have struggled with defining what type of use 
of a trademark would meet the “use in commerce” requirement, re-
sulting in a lack of consistency in the opinions of different courts con-
fronted with the issue.
 
52 At the heart of the debate is whether the defi-
nition of “use in commerce” provided in section 45 of the Act applies 
to all uses of the term throughout the Act, including the infringement 
provisions, or if it is only meant to apply to the provisions that set the 
standards and circumstances under which a mark owner can register 
the mark and receive the benefits of protection of the mark provided 
by the Act.53 Section 45 provides in part that “a mark shall be deemed 
to be in use in commerce … on services when it is used or displayed 
in the sale or advertising of services and the services are rendered in 
commerce….”54
Some courts have found that the section 45 definition applies to 
all uses of the term in the Act, while others have found that it only 
  
  
 46 § 1114. 
 47 § 1125. 
 48 § 1114 (1)(a) (emphasis added). 
 49 § 1125 (a)(1) (emphasis added). 
 50 See, e.g., Rescuecom, 562 F.3d at 127-31. 
 51 See, e.g., Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 704 
(E.D. Va. 2004) (finding that Google’s sale of plaintiff’s trademark as a keyword was 
a sufficient “use in commerce” to sustain a trademark infringement cause of action); 
Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., No. 1:04CV507, 2005 WL 1903128, at *3-7 
(E.D. Va. Aug. 8, 2005) (analyzing whether Google’s sale of plaintiff’s trademark as 
a keyword was likely to cause consumer confusion and therefore to constitute trade-
mark infringement). 
 52 See Rescuecom, 562 F.3d at 131–41 (discussing the debate and different 
interpretations of the “use in commerce” language for infringement liability). 
 53 Id. 
 54 § 1127. 
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applies to the registration provisions.55
Without a clear answer to the question of whether the Section 45 
definition applies to the infringement provisions, and if not, what ex-
actly is a “use in commerce,” courts have reached inconsistent results 
as to whether the sale or purchase of a trademark as a searchable key-
word in a keyword advertising program was sufficient for infringe-
ment liability. Courts in the First,
 The debate is critical for key-
word advertising and other trademark disputes in the Internet context 
because if a narrow section 45 definition applies to all uses of the term 
throughout the Act, then the type of use of another’s mark that is suf-
ficient for infringement liability is a very limited and specific type of 
use, and thus the bar is set very high for plaintiffs alleging infringe-
ment. If the definition does not apply to the infringement provisions, 
then the “use in commerce” requirement can be met by some other 
less clearly defined type of use, and could encompass a much broader 
array of uses of another’s mark, at the extreme, allowing plaintiffs to 
bring infringement suits based on a seemingly limitless variety of 
trademark uses, as long as that use was somehow commercial. 
B. Inconsistency in the Courts  
56 Second,57 Third,58 Fourth,59 
Eighth,60 and Ninth61
  
 55 Compare U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 723, 
727-29 (E.D. Va. 2003) and Wells Fargo & Co., v. WhenU.com, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 
2d 734, 746-47 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (finding the section 45 definition applies to all uses 
of the term “use in commerce” in the Act) with Rescuecom, 562 F.3d at 131-41 (ar-
guing that the section 45 definition should only apply to the registration provisions, 
and not to the infringement provisions). 
 56 See, e.g., Hearts On Fire Co. v. Blue Nile, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 274 (D. 
Mass. 2009) (interpreting “use in commerce” when defendant bought plaintiff’s 
trademark as keyword); Boston Duck Tours, LP v. Super Duck Tours, LLC, 527 F. 
Supp. 2d 205 (D. Mass. 2007) (interpreting “use in commerce” when defendant pur-
chased plaintiff’s trademark through Google AdWords), rev’d in part on other 
grounds, 531 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2008)). 
 57 See, e.g., Rescuecom, 562 F.3d 123. 
 58 See, e.g., 800-JR Cigar, Inc. v. GoTo.com, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 2d 273 (D. 
N.J. 2006) (analyzing “use in commerce” when search engine suggested plaintiff’s 
trademark as keyword for plaintiff’s competitors, accepted bids for the trademark as 
keyword, and ranked paid keywords above other search results); Buying For the 
Home, LLC v. Humble Abode, LLC, 459 F. Supp. 2d 310 (D. N.J. 2006) (determin-
ing “use in commerce” for keyword purchase). 
 59 See, e.g., Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700 (E.D. 
Va. 2004) (finding “use in commerce” when Google allowed advertisers to buy plain-
tiff’s trademark as search term and to pay for advertising linked to the trademark). 
 60 See, e.g., Edina Realty, Inc. v. TheMLSonline.com, No. Civ. 04-
4371JRTFLN, 2006 WL 737064 (D. Minn. Mar. 20, 2006) (finding “use in com-
merce” when defendant bought plaintiff’s trademark as keyword). 
 Circuits have found the sale or purchase of 
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trademarks as searchable keywords sufficient to meet this require-
ment, while courts in the Second,62 Fourth,63 and Sixth64 Circuits have 
found it insufficient. Arguably, the courts have exhibited a trend to-
ward an understanding that the suggestion and sale of trademarks as 
keywords does meet the threshold “use in commerce” requirement, 
whether the court uses the section 45 definition or not.65
Because of the lack of consensus among courts, scholars have ad-
vocated a variety of solutions to what many of them see as the prob-
lem of overprotection of trademarks on the Internet and the question 
of whether and what type of a “use in commerce” is required for 
 However, the 
lack of consensus has resulted in wasteful litigation and the increased 
possibility that search engines will receive conflicting decisions re-
garding their keyword advertising programs. Thus, the sale of trade-
marks as keywords in one jurisdiction could be legal, while in anoth-
er, the very same practice could amount to trademark infringement. 
III. BRINGING CLARITY TO THE USE IN COMMERCE 
CONFUSION: SCHOLARLY PROPOSALS 
  
 61 See, e.g., Soilworks, LLC v. Midwest Indus. Supply, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 2d 
1118 (D. Ariz. 2008) (finding “use in commerce” where defendant purchased plain-
tiff’s trademark as keyword from Google); Google, Inc. v. Am. Blind & Wallpaper 
Factory, Inc., No. C 03-05340 JF, 2005 WL 832398 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2005) (find-
ing “use in commerce” when Google sold plaintiff’s trademark). 
 62 See, e.g., 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 
2005) (finding no “use in commerce” when defendant’s software generated pop-up 
ads based on trademarks entered as search terms by the user); Site Pro-1, Inc. v. Bet-
ter Metal, LLC, 506 F. Supp. 2d 123 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (determining no “use in com-
merce” when defendant purchased sponsored advertisement from Yahoo! based on 
plaintiff’s trademark); Merck & Co. v. Mediplan Health Consulting, Inc., 425 F. 
Supp. 2d 402 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (concluding no “use in commerce” when defendant 
purchased plaintiff’s trademark as keyword). These cases are arguably superseded by 
Rescuecom, 562 F. 3d 123. 
 63 See, e.g., U-Haul Int’l v. WhenU.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 723 (E.D. Va. 
2003) (declining to find “use in commerce” for pop-up software that generated pop-
up advertisements based on trademarks entered as search terms). 
 64 See, e.g., Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734 
(E.D. Mich. 2003) (finding no “use in commerce” for pop-up software that generated 
pop-up advertisements based on trademarks entered as search terms). 
 65 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Rescuecom factually dis-
tinguished its previous holding in 1-800 Contacts to find that Google’s recommenda-
tion and sale of Rescuecom’s trademark to a competitor was a “use in commerce” 
sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Rescuecom, 526 F. 3d at 127-31. To that 
point, the Second Circuit was the only circuit court to find that keyword based adver-
tising did not constitute a “use in commerce” and advocates of the narrow Section 45 
definition of “use in commerce” considered the Rescuecom decision as a big victory 
for their argument. 
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trademark infringement liability. There are essentially three compet-
ing views: (1) the view that a very narrow type of “use in commerce,” 
based largely on the section 45 definition, is required for infringement 
advocated by the trademark use scholars;66 (2) the view that the sec-
tion 45 definition does not apply to the infringement provisions and 
therefore a much broader range of uses is sufficient for infringement 
liability;67 and (3) the view that while a specific type of use is re-
quired, based again largely on the section 45 definition, diligent en-
forcement of this requirement by courts would still not provide any 
meaningful guidance and consistency in determining what real world 
uses meet this requirement.68
First, the trademark use scholars argue that infringement requires 
a very particular type of use, based largely on the section 45 definition 
of “use in commerce.”
 As discussed below, each view leads to 
a different proposed resolution of the perceived problem of the over-
protection of trademark rights on the Internet, but ultimately each 
offered solution is less than optimal for a variety of reasons. 
A. Trademark Use Theory: “Use in Commerce” Requires a Prototypi-
cal Trademark Use for Infringement 
69 They assert that what is required is essential-
ly the prototypical trademark use: attaching a trademark to a good or 
service “in a manner that invites consumers to associate the mark with 
the goods or services the user is offering for sale or distribution.”70 To 
be liable under this theory, the “defendant must directly present con-
sumers with the allegedly infringing mark in a way that allows con-
sumers to rely on the mark to identify goods or services being offered 
by the defendant and to distinguish them from the goods or services of 
others.”71 Restated succinctly: “[t]he use must be a trademark use—a 
use that permits consumers to identify the source of the user’s goods 
or services….”72
  
 66 See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law 
Through Trademark Use, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1669, 1675-77 (2007) [hereinafter Dogan 
& Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law]. 
 67 See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis, Confusion Over Use: 
Contextualism in Trademark Law, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1597, 1609-15 (2007). 
 68 See Mark P. McKenna, Trademark Use and the Problem of Source, 2009 
U. ILL. L. REV. 773, 773-78 (2009) [hereinafter McKenna, Trademark Use]. 
 69 See Dogan & Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law, supra note 66, at 1675-
77. 
 70 Barrett, supra note 15, at 395. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. 
 The trademark use scholars argue that if courts prop-
erly applied the existing trademark use requirement, they would large-
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ly resolve the problem of overprotection of marks on the Internet.73
Use theorists see the trademark use requirement as a limiting de-
vice to control the infringement actions, serving the dual purpose of 
preventing interference with consumers’ ability to rely on trademarks 
for product information, while not overly interfering with the free 
flow of marketplace information to consumers.
 
Under this theory then, for example, if Blimpie buys the trademark 
“Quiznos” as a keyword from Google, this does not constitute true 
“trademark use” by Blimpie, or by Google, because neither are identi-
fying themselves as Quiznos. Rather, Blimpie has another associa-
tion—it sells competing goods—which trademark law does not reach. 
74 They highly value 
the free flow of commercial information to consumers in the market-
place and are thus leary of an overactive role for infringement suits.75
Some scholars argue that the “use in commerce” language in the 
infringement provisions is not bound by the definition of “use in 
 
The rationale behind this line of thinking is that consumers ultimately 
benefit when the marketplace for commercial information is relatively 
free flowing. The more information available to consumers, the better 
off the consumers are. Thus, use theorists support the sale of trade-
marks as keywords by search engines because they see the practice as 
ultimately benefiting consumers by providing them with additional 
valuable information, including, for instance, price and product com-
parisons, information about companion goods, and links to competing 
vendors. Use theorists argue that the trademark use requirement 
should encourage this type of use by the search engines by limiting 
infringement liability, thus facilitating the delivery of the additional 
commercial information to consumers, lowering their search costs, 
and thereby serving the fundamental goal of trademark law. 
B. The “Use in Commerce” Requirement Encompasses a Much 
Broader Array of Uses and Use Is Only One Factor to Consider in 
Determining Infringement Liability 
  
 73 See Dogan & Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs, supra 
note 8, at 837-38; Barrett, supra note 15, at 450-56. 
 74 Barrett, supra note 15, at 378-79 (“The trademark use requirement tailors 
the infringement cause of action to ensure that it effectively serves its purpose—
preventing interference with consumers’ ability to rely on marks for product informa-
tion—without interfering unduly with the free flow of useful marketplace information 
to consumers.”) (footnote omitted). 
 75 See Dogan & Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs, supra 
note 8, at 778-83 (discussing with concern recent developments in trademark law 
which threaten its information facilitating function); Barrett, supra note 15, at 450 
(arguing that overprotection on the Internet upsets the balance between deceptive use 
and use that fosters the flow of information to consumers). 
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commerce” in section 45 and therefore a much broader array of uses 
of another’s trademark can lead to infringement liability.76 These 
scholars argue that the section 45 definition of infringement was 
meant to apply only to the registration provisions.77 As support, they 
note that although the section 45 definition has been continually the 
focus of litigation, most of the cases involve the establishment of 
trademark rights, whether to assert claims based on unregistered 
trademarks, or to register a mark.78 In these cases, the definition be-
came a litigated issue because for a firm to assert rights based on a 
trademark, it must have used the trademark in commerce in accor-
dance with the section 45 definition.79 They argue that the inclusion of 
“use in commerce” language in the infringement provisions was large-
ly a way for Congress to tie its regulation of trademarks, and its crea-
tion of a cause of action in federal courts, to interstate commerce to 
avoid any constitutional jurisdictional problems.80 Thus, while a de-
fendant must use plaintiff’s trademark to incur infringement liability, 
the type of use required is not the narrow type contained in the section 
45 definition, which is only meant to define what type of use is 
needed to get the protections of the Act. Instead, courts should ana-
lyze each infringement case using a contextual balancing approach, 
where the nature of the defendant’s use of plaintiff’s mark is but one 
factor to consider.81
The proponents of this understanding of the “use in commerce” 
language have a slightly different understanding of how trademark 
law serves the goal of lowering consumer search costs. They generally 
agree that “[t]rademark law is intended to foster accurate and helpful 
 Under this approach, Google and other alleged 
infringers could not rely on motions to dismiss based on plaintiff’s 
failure to allege a particular type of infringing use, but instead would 
have to litigate the dispute to its end, with the court focusing mainly 
on the likelihood that defendant’s use of plaintiff’s mark would con-
fuse consumers. 
  
 76 See Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 67, at 1609-15 (criticizing the view 
that the section 45 “use in commerce” definition limits the types of uses of a trade-
mark that are sufficient for infringement liability). 
 77 See id. at 1609-10.  
 78 Id. at 1610. 
 79 Id. (“[A] firm must use a mark (not merely conceive of it) in order to as-
sert rights, and that use generally must be ‘in commerce.’”). 
 80 Id. at 1610 (“Absent this [use in commerce] limitation, Congress might 
lack authority to enact federal trademark legislation by virtue of the Supreme Court’s 
opinion in The Trademark Cases. Strictly speaking, remedying that constitutional 
defect simply required Congress to link federal trademark law to interstate com-
merce.”) (footnote omitted).  
 81 Id. at 1621. 
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information,” but “emphasize that [it] has never been based on the 
notion that the maximum amount of information flow is optimal for 
consumers.”82 Essentially, they argue that trademark use theorists rely 
too heavily on the assumption that more information is always better 
for the consumer. Instead, they argue that with the rise of the Internet, 
there is a risk of information overload, and thus the reliability of the 
information presented to consumers is of paramount importance.83 
Therefore, more policing of trademarks is required to ensure that con-
sumers receive reliable, non-confusing information.84
The middle ground position in the trademark use debate argues 
that a specific trademark use—using a mark as an indicator of source 
of one’s goods or services—is required for liability under the Lanham 
Act, but cannot consistently serve as a limiting mechanism that use 
theorists desire.
 Under this 
view, a narrowly construed “use in commerce” requirement, as advo-
cated by the trademark use theorists, would disserve consumers be-
cause it would not allow trademark law to police the continually de-
veloping online marketing world to ensure that consumers receive 
reliable information. The proper way to deal with the new marketing 
technologies and schemes would not be to shut off trademark law 
from having any say in their development, but instead to let courts 
work out a case-by-case understanding of the proper balance between 
the interests of trademark holders and consumers. 
C. A Middle Ground: A Specific “Trademark Use” Is Required for 
Infringement Liability, but the Trademark Use Requirement Cannot 
Serve as the Limiting Mechanism that Use Theorists Desire 
85 Under this view, courts cannot consistently utilize 
the trademark use requirement as a threshold to liability because 
trademark use can only be considered from the perspective of con-
sumers—that is, only by determining whether consumers are likely to 
view the defendant’s use as indicative of the source of defendant’s 
goods or services.86 This inquiry into the consumer’s understanding is 
inherently highly contextual and therefore incapable of serving as the 
limiting mechanism that its advocates seek.87
  
 82 Id. at 1622. 
 83 See id. (arguing for more supervision of information passed to consumers 
via Internet intermediaries to ensure that consumers receive accurate and helpful 
information without suffering from information overload).  
 84 Id.  
 85 See generally McKenna, Trademark Use, supra note 68. 
 86 Id. at 773. 
 87 Id. 
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Essentially, this view argues that while a trademark use is re-
quired for infringement liability, and always has been as its present-
day advocates suggest, the use of the doctrine as a mechanism for 
limiting the scope of liability and for creating predictability is imposs-
ible because there is no adequately clear standard or definition by 
which courts could distinguish trademark uses from non-trademark 
uses.88 Most of the definitions advocated by use theorists lack speci-
ficity and instead focus generally on use that promotes one’s goods or 
services or indicates the source or sponsorship of goods or services.89 
These non-specific definitions are “the best [scholars] can hope for 
because the only trademark use limitation in the Lanham Act is a 
functional one: the infringement provisions implicitly limit liability to 
uses by the defendant that indicate the source of its products or servic-
es.”90 These definitions cannot consistently help courts avoid pro-
tracted litigation by acting as a threshold motion to dismiss question 
because the only way for a court to determine whether the use in ques-
tion is sufficient for liability is to examine whether the “evidence sug-
gests consumers are likely to view the defendant’s use as one that 
indicates the source of the defendant’s products or services.”91 Thus, 
the determination of whether a use is a trademark use cannot be made 
without resorting to a context-heavy examination of consumer under-
standing of the use, and thus cannot serve as the limiting mechanism 
that the trademark use theorists desire.92
Proponents of this view agree with use theorists that there is a 
problem of overprotection of trademarks on the Internet, but find that 
the problem is deeper than a question of whether a particular use is a 
sufficient trademark use. The problem in modern trademark law, they 
argue, is that almost every significant doctrine limiting trademark 





 88 Id. at 775. 
 89 Id. (“Dogan and Lemley, for example, do not specifically define trademark 
use but focus on uses ‘to promote [a party’s] own products or services’ or ‘to indicate 
the source or sponsorship of [the party’s] products or services.’”) (citing Dogan & 
Lemley, Grounding Trademark Law, supra note 66, at 1682). 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. at 775-76. 
 92 See id. at 776 (“Indeed, precisely because trademark use is not separable 
from consumer understanding, proponents cannot articulate the doctrine without 
lapsing into claims about the likelihood of confusion….[Thus], trademark use is 
simply likelihood of confusion by another name, and it suffers from all the same 
problems trademark use advocates claim the doctrine solves.”). 
 93 Id. 
 The instability is particularly a problem because the 
relevant consumer understanding is of the “source” of a good or ser-
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vice. “Source” is “an extraordinarily vague concept capable of en-
compassing almost any imaginable relationship between parties.”94 To 
take the position to the extreme, almost any use of another’s trade-
mark could lead to infringement liability if the consumer’s under-
standing were so inclined.95
Under this view, Google can have an infringement suit arising 
from its AdWords program dismissed only if it can show that con-
sumers understood that Google was not using the trademark to pro-
mote its own services or to indicate source or sponsorship of its ser-
vices. More specifically, to decide whether to grant a motion to dis-
miss for failure to allege a trademark use, the court must determine 
whether consumers are likely to perceive Google’s use of the mark as 
an indication of the source of its services or as indicative of a sponsor-
ship or affiliation relationship.
  
96 The question is whether the purchas-
ers of the trademark as a keyword from Google are likely to believe 
that Google’s use of the trademark indicates a sponsorship or affilia-
tion between the mark holder and Google; or whether consumers who 
search for the trademark understand that Google in generating its 
search results was using the trademark in some way that indicates a 
source, sponsorship, or affiliation relationship between it and the 
trademark owner. Because this determination cannot be separated 
from the perspective of consumers, it cannot serve as a threshold re-
quirement separable from the evidence-heavy likelihood of confusion 
analysis.97
Advocates of this view argue that the trademark use debate shows 
a fundamental inadequacy of modern trademark theory. They argue 
that its focus on consumer understanding, which is “highly contextual 
and ill-suited to early resolution” in a dispute, “mean[ing] the trade-
mark use determination is likely to be fairly unpredictable from an ex 




 94 Id.  
 95 See id. at 776-77 (“[I]magine consumers came to believe that no one could 
legally use the ‘Nike’ mark in any way without Nike’s permission….Operating under 
such a belief, consumers who encountered an article in [a newspaper] entitled ‘Nike 
Releases New Cross-Training Line” might well expect that the [newspaper] had li-
censed the use of the Nike mark. If the newspaper did not license use of the Nike 
mark, these consumers would be confused about Nike’s sponsorship or affiliation 
with the [newspaper] and the paper’s use would therefore infringe Nike’s rights.”) 
(footnotes omitted).  
 96 See id. at 812. 
 97 Id. at 816. 
 98 Id. at 821. 
 To resolve the problem, a 
“fundamental rethinking of the purposes of trademark law” is re-
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quired.99 No such rethinking has been suggested thus far, but propo-
nents of this view argue that the current search costs rationale and 
focus on consumer understanding and likelihood of confusion need to 
be wholly reworked in order to “develop a richer theoretical basis for 
protecting source indicators and a better understanding of the alleged 
harms suffered by consumers and producers when consumers are con-
fused” by uses of trademarks.100
Each of the approaches offered above are not optimal for a variety 
of reasons. The trademark use theorists essentially argue that the li-
miting mechanisms that are needed to properly restrict the expansion 
of trademark rights on the Internet already exist in the law and there-
fore all that is required is that courts properly enforce these already 
existing limiting mechanisms, mainly the trademark use require-
ment.
 
D. Criticism of the Offered Solutions 
101 This theory and solution is unworkable in reality for several 
reasons. First, there is no consensus, and actually a highly contested 
debate, about whether the trademark use requirement exists at all, and 
even if it does, whether it exists in the form that the use theorists pro-
pose.102 Second, some argue that even though the trademark use re-
quirement exists largely in the form that use theorists propose, it can-
not function as the limiting mechanism that use theorists desire be-
cause it cannot be separated from the context-heavy consumer under-
standing perspective.103 Finally, whether the use theorists have the 
better historical or analytical legal argument about the existence and 
function of the trademark use requirement, courts have not been over-
ly accepting of their view.104 Instead, the trend in courts is away from 
recognizing the trademark use requirement as the desired limiting 
mechanism.105
  
 99 Id. at 824. 
 100 Id. 
 101 See, e.g., Dogan & Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs, 
supra note 8; Barrett, supra note 15. 
 102 See, e.g., Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 67; Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, 
Inc., 562 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 103 See McKenna, Trademark Use, supra note 68. 
 104 See discussion supra Section II.B; Rescuecom, 562 F.3d 123. 
 105 See discussion supra Section II.B; Rescuecom, 562 F.3d 123. 
 Thus, even if use theorists have the better argument, it 
is unlikely, based on stare decisis and the diverse nature of our federal 
courts system, that courts will uniformly adopt their position anytime 
in the foreseeable future, barring a favorable Supreme Court decision. 
For the use theorists, some other limiting mechanism is necessary. 
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Others argue that the trademark use requirement is met by a much 
broader range of uses than those found in the section 45 definition of 
“use in commerce” and that the solution to the perceived problem of 
overprotection of trademark rights on the Internet is to allow the 
courts to work through each dispute using a case-by-case, likelihood 
of confusion analysis.106 Again, even if this group has the better of the 
historical and analytical arguments about the existence and function of 
the trademark use requirement, its solution is not optimal for several 
reasons. First, litigating trademark infringement disputes is very cost-
ly, and that cost is increasing.107 Second, because of the diverse nature 
of the federal court system and the inherent unpredictability involved 
in the typical likelihood of confusion analysis,108 allowing each case 
to be decided independently across jurisdictions could, and has, lead 
to a patchwork of inconsistent results. This inconsistency creates un-
desirable instability and uncertainty for search engines, advertisers, 
and trademark holders alike. Without uniformity across jurisdic-
tions,109
  
 106 See Dinwoodie & Janis, supra note 67. 
 107 See SALVATORE ANASTASI & KEVIN ALAN WOLFF, AMERICAN 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 22 
(2005). The average total cost of a trademark infringement suit where less than 
$1,000,000 was at risk was $230,000 in 2001, $298,000 in 2003, and $300,000 in 
2005. The average total cost of a trademark infringement suit where between 
$1,000,000 and $25,000,000 was at risk was $502,000 in 2001, $602,000 in 2003, and 
$700,000 in 2005. The average total cost of a trademark infringement suit where more 
than $25,000,000 was at risk was $1,001,000 in 2001, $1,006,000 in 2003, and 
$1,250,000 in 2005. Id. 
 108 See Ann Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 721, 
770-796 (2004) (criticizing how some judges use the analysis by generally characte-
rizing consumers as unintelligent and thus easily confused); Barton Beebe, An Empir-
ical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 
1581 (2006) (examining and criticizing the significant variation between the likelih-
ood of confusion tests that exist in each federal circuit); McKenna, Trademark Use, 
supra note 68, at 816-19 (criticizing the likelihood of confusion analysis). See also 
Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., No. 1:04CV507, 2005 WL 1903128, at *5-7 
(E.D. Va. Aug. 8, 2005) (The court recognized that parties commonly introduce re-
sults of customer or potential customer surveys to prove a likelihood or the absence of 
confusion, then went on to criticize the methodology used in plaintiff’s survey. This 
shows how the likelihood of confusion analysis can easily turn into a battle of com-
peting customer surveys created by the opposing parties.). 
 109 Obviously, uniformity can only be forced upon different jurisdictions by a 
Supreme Court decision or congressional legislation. 
 all parties attached to the trademark dispute, which because it 
arises out of online behavior is inevitably cross-jurisdictional, are un-
able to predict or determine what their legal rights and liabilities are, 
and therefore are unable to confidently mold their behavior to those 
standards. Finally, if one accepts the idea that producing better-
informed consumers and reducing consumer search costs is the fun-
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damental normative goal of trademark law, as the vast majority of 
trademark scholars do,110
Finally, some argue that the trademark use requirement does exist 
as the use theorists propose, but that it cannot serve the limiting func-
tion they desire because of fundamental inadequacies in modern 
trademark law.
 then the practice of selling non-deceptive 
advertisements based on trademarks as keywords should be encour-
aged, not discouraged, by the law. The case-by-case litigation ap-
proach would discourage the practice, which is ultimately beneficial 
to consumers seeking information about products and services online 
and is not unfairly detrimental to trademark holders. 
111 Thus, to solve the problem of overprotection of 
trademark rights on the Internet and elsewhere, a fundamental rework-
ing of trademark law, from its intellectual underpinnings (based cur-
rently on the search costs rationale) to its analytical methods (based 
currently on consumer understanding) is necessary.112 Even while 
proposing this solution, its proponent acknowledges its main prob-
lem—it would be a significant undertaking and no one has advocated 
any real replacement for the current trademark law regime.113
  
 110 See McKenna, Normative Foundations, supra note 16, at 1844 (“It would 
be difficult to overstate the level of consensus among commentators that the goal of 
trademark law is—and always has been—to improve the quality of information in the 
marketplace and thereby reduce consumer search costs.”). 
 111 See McKenna, Trademark Use, supra note 68, at 796-97 (“Unfortunately, 
[the] implicit trademark use requirement cannot serve the limiting function propo-
nents desire because the question of whether a particular use denotes source can be 
determined only by reference to consumer understanding.”). 
 112 See id. at 821-28. 
 113 Id. at 824 (framing the need for a revised approach, but declining to pro-
vide a concrete resolution). 
 To fun-
damentally rework an entire body of law, which has existed in its cur-
rent codified form for more than 60 years and in the common law for 
much longer, is an ambitious task, one which is unlikely to occur any 
time soon. Besides the unrealistic aspect of the undertaking, it is argu-
ably undesirable to discard so many years of law for a new untested 
and undeveloped scheme. The basic functions and theories of trade-
mark law have remained relatively unchanged for such a long period 
of time because of their practicality and success. Fundamentally 
changing them would not be the wisest solution. Instead, a more mod-
est, restrained approach to the specific problem is more desirable. 
After all, the current problem has arisen only because courts have 
struggled to apply the traditional trademark concepts and doctrines to 
a new medium and method of marketing. Thus, a narrow congression-
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al response is the best immediate solution to the problems that have 
arisen.114
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently requested 
that Congress study and resolve the debate regarding what “use in 
commerce” means, and what its function is, in the infringement provi-
sions of the Lanham Act.
 
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION: SAFE HARBOR TO 
SHIELD SEARCH ENGINES AND ONLINE 
ADVERTISERS FROM LIABILITY FOR THE 
PURCHASE AND SALE OF TRADEMARKS AS 
KEYWORDS THAT TRIGGER THE DISPLAY OF 
NONDECEPTIVE ADVERTISEMENTS 
115 In an attempt to resolve the confusion 
surrounding the trademark use requirement and the inconsistency in 
the federal courts regarding its application, Congress could study the 
problem and choose to adopt one of the proposals of the three compet-
ing camps discussed in Part III. Each argument is compelling but as 
discussed above, choosing which group has the best historical and 
analytical argument may not entirely solve the problem.116
Congress should create a new statutory safe harbor that immuniz-
es search engines and online advertisers from liability for the sale and 
purchase of trademarks as keywords that trigger nondeceptive adver-
tisements. With the right safe harbor, Congress can properly balance 
the interests of trademark owners in protecting the integrity of their 
mark and consumers in reducing their search costs by conclusively 
protecting the use of trademarks as keywords that trigger nondecep-
tive advertisements. This would facilitate the flow of truthful and use-
ful information to consumers, while leaving open the possibility for 
infringement liability for uses of trademarks as keywords that trigger 
deceptive advertisements. The proper safe harbor can serve the fun-
damental goal of trademark law—to improve the quality of commer-
cial information in the marketplace and thereby reduce consumer 
 Because 
the controversial trademark use requirement cannot functionally serve 
as a pre-trial mechanism to limit infringement liability in keyword 
advertising cases, Congress should enter the fray and affirmatively 
classify certain uses of trademarks as keywords as non-infringing—
that is, as not likely to confuse consumers.  
  
 114 See Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 140-41 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(discussing possible interpretations for the “use in commerce” definition in dictum 
and suggesting that Congress is better suited to resolve the ambiguity). 
 115 Id. 
 116 See discussion supra Section III.D. 
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search costs117
Congress has immunized Internet intermediaries from liability for 
content posted or sent through their systems by third parties in a varie-
ty of contexts.
—and can serve as the pre-trial limiting mechanism that 
the trademark use requirement cannot. 
A. The Reasoning Behind Internet Safe Harbors 
118 The logic behind the immunizations is clear: the 
intermediaries process hundreds of millions of data transfers each day 
and link to billions of items of third party content. The only way they 
can quickly and efficiently process that mass of data is to automate the 
process. Thus, although some of the content hosted or linked to by 
these intermediaries may be illegal,119 Congress has determined that 
the possibility of holding the intermediaries liable every time a third 
party posted questionable content is undesirable because the resulting 
threat of liability and efforts to defend against liability would incapa-
citate the Internet.120
Missing from Congress’ various grants of immunization is a safe 
harbor shielding Internet intermediaries from liability for trademark 




 117 See McKenna, Normative Foundations, supra note 16, at 1844 (describing 
the conventional wisdoms about trademark law and its overall objectives). 
 118 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(B)-(C) (2006) (limiting remedies for trade-
mark infringement in narrow circumstances—where violation is part of paid adver-
tisement in newspaper, magazine, or other similar periodical or in an electronic com-
munication—to injunction); 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006) (immunizing intermediaries from 
liability for copyright infringement based on copyrighted content posted by third 
party users); 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006) (immunizing intermediaries from liability for all 
causes of action other than intellectual property). See also Mark A. Lemley, Rationa-
lizing Internet Safe Harbors, 6 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 101 (2007) (dis-
cussing the differences among various safe harbors for Internet intermediaries and 
advocating for a uniform approach). 
 119 For instance, Internet Service Providers (ISPs) may infringe patents, copy-
rights or trademarks, or defame others, or violate child pornography laws, or any 
number of other possible illegal acts. See Lemley, supra note 118, at 101. 
 120 Lemley, supra note 118, at 101-02; see Frank Pasquale, Copyright in an 
Era of Information Overload: Toward the Privileging of Categorizers, 60 VAND. L. 
REV. 135 (2007) (arguing that search engines and other Internet intermediaries de-
serve special legal protections from liability to third parties because they help society 
deal with the problem of information overload through the automatic sorting of con-
tent). 
 121 For example, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(B)-(C) provides a limited protection 
from damages, but only applies in narrow circumstances and still allows injunctions 
against the Internet intermediary. 
 To fill 
this gap, Congress should amend the Lanham Act to shield search 
engines and online advertisers from liability for nondeceptive uses of 
trademarks in online advertising programs like Google AdWords. But 
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how can Congress distinguish between deceptive and nondeceptive 
uses? As one commentator has noted, it is nearly impossible to make 
this distinction from an ex ante perspective because any determination 
of whether a use is deceptive (or likely to confuse consumers) must be 
made from the perspective of consumers.122
Congress should immunize search engines and online advertisers 
from infringement liability for the sale and purchase of trademarks as 
keywords when the triggered ads do not display trademarks of third 
parties. Written decisions in keyword advertising cases rarely directly 
confront and analyze the likelihood of confusion issue,
 Nevertheless, by applying 
lessons from early keyword advertising cases, Congress can draw a 
fair and reasonable line that separates uses which may lead to in-
fringement liability from those that may not.  
B. Building a Safe Harbor to Immunize Certain Uses of Trademarks 
as Keywords  
123 however 
some courts have discussed the issue enough to give Congress guid-
ance about what is likely to confuse (to be deceptive to consumers). 
For instance, several early cases involved pop-up advertisement soft-
ware, which used an internal directory to compile common keywords, 
including trademarks.  When downloaded onto a user’s computer, the 
program displayed pop-up advertisements based on the user’s Internet 
activity and a term in the software’s directory. In those cases, the 
courts found that because, among other reasons, the software did not 
display the trademarks in the advertisements, the software provider 
was not liable for infringement.124 The pop-up ad cases are factually 
distinguishable from the Google AdWords cases because the pop-up 
ad software only used the trademarks in an internal directory, and did 
not sell the trademarks as keywords.125
  
 122 See McKenna, Trademark Use, supra note 68, at 773. 
 123 It appears that only one keyword advertising case discussed the merits of 
the likelihood of confusion analysis created by a keyword advertising program in 
depth. See Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., No. 1:04CV507, 2005 WL 1903128, 
*3-7 (E.D. Va. Aug. 8, 2005). 
 124 See, e.g., 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 414 F.3d 400, 410-12 
(2d Cir. 2005); Wells Fargo & Co. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 2d 734, 757-61 
(E.D. Mich. 2003); U-Haul Int’l, Inc. v. WhenU.com, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 723, 727-
29 (E.D. Va. 2003). 
 125 1-800 Contacts, 414 F.3d at 408; Wells Fargo, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 762; U-
Haul Int’l, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 728. 
  However, these distinctions 
relate to the issue of whether the use of the trademark is a sufficient 
“use in commerce” to trigger infringement liability and do not have 
any bearing on whether the displayed advertisement is deceptive or 
likely to confuse. Thus, the logic underlying the distinction between 
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advertisements that display another’s mark, and those that do not, can 
be used as guidance for Congress. 
As noted previously, courts have increasingly found that Google’s 
sale of a trademark as a keyword is a sufficient “use in commerce” to 
trigger infringement liability,126 but in order for Google or the adver-
tiser to ultimately be found liable for infringement, the plaintiff must 
show actual or likely confusion.127 In perhaps the only Google Ad-
Words case to have an opinion written on the likelihood of confusion, 
GEICO v. Google, the court found that although the sale of the trade-
mark as a keyword constituted a sufficient “use in commerce” for 
infringement liability,128 the plaintiff failed to show a likelihood of 
confusion when the plaintiff’s marks were not used in the headings or 
text of the displayed advertisement.129 The plaintiff relied on surveys 
to demonstrate a strong likelihood of confusion caused by any use of 
its trademarks in the AdWords program. The court however found 
that a likelihood of confusion existed only when the plaintiff’s trade-
marks were actually displayed in the advertiser’s ad.130
  
 126 See discussion supra Section II.B. 
 127 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (To constitute infringement, a use of a 
trademark must be “likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to 
the affiliation,…or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of … goods [or] servic-
es.”). 
 128 Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 705 (E.D. Va. 
2004) (“GEICO has alleged that the advertisers made ‘use in commerce’ of the 
trademarks by using the marks as source identifiers in the advertising links posted on 
Google’s search results page. This is sufficient to state a claim for…trademark in-
fringement.”). 
 129 Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., No. 1:04CV507, 2005 WL 1903128, 
at *7 (E.D. Va. Aug. 8, 2005) (further clarifying the previous GEICO decision and 
finding that GEICO “failed to establish a likelihood of confusions stemming from 
Google’s use of GEICO’s trademark as a keyword…to violate either the Lanham Act 
or Virginia common law”).  
 130 See id. (finding that plaintiff failed to show a likelihood of confusion by 
Google’s use of plaintiff’s mark as a keyword, but finding that the advertiser’s display 
of plaintiff’s marks in the sponsored link, triggered by the keyword, established a 
likelihood of confusion); see also Hearts on Fire Co. v. Blue Nile, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 
2d 274, 287-89 (D. Mass. 2009) (The court discussed, with skepticism, initial interest 
confusion when plaintiff’s marks are not displayed in an advertisement because an 
Internet consumer who is initially confused can easily click the “back” button to 
return almost instantly to the search results list to find the initially sought product or 
website.); Site Pro-1, Inc. v. Better Metal, LLC, 506 F. Supp. 2d 123, 127-28 
(E.D.N.Y. 2007) (noting significantly that the plaintiff’s mark was not displayed in 
the sponsored search result linking to defendant’s website, but ultimately dismissing 
on the grounds that the purchase of plaintiff’s mark as a keyword was not a sufficient 
“use in commerce” to support an infringement claim). 
 Thus, the court 
implicitly drew the very line between use that is likely to confuse and 
use that is not likely to confuse advocated in the proposed safe harbor. 
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By drawing a definitive line marking the boundary between abso-
lutely non-infringing use of a trademark as a keyword in an advertis-
ing program (use which is conclusively not likely to confuse) and 
other uses which may potentially be infringing (uses which may be 
likely to confuse), the safe harbor can act as the limiting mechanism 
that the trademark use requirement cannot. With the safe harbor, 
search engines, online advertisers, and courts can predictably rely on 
motions to dismiss for early resolution of infringement suits which do 
not allege the use of the plaintiff’s trademark in the displayed adver-
tisement. The safe harbor would provide a degree of stability and pre-
dictability by recognizing that certain types of advertisements are not 
likely to confuse consumers and thereby eliminating the unpredictable 
likelihood of confusion analysis from this less dangerous class of 
keyword advertising cases.131
The safe harbor would not overly immunize advertisers or search 
engines, as the more dangerous uses would not be conclusively pro-
tected. For instance, if an advertiser displayed a plaintiff’s trademark 
in an ad, the plaintiff would have a chance at trial to show that con-
sumers were actually or likely to be confused by the use of his trade-
mark in the advertisement. Defendants in such cases may have legiti-
mate defenses for such uses such as a comparative advertising de-
fense.
  
132 However, if there is no legitimate defense and the advertise-
ment was likely to confuse consumers, there is no search cost ratio-
nale for protecting such a use because search costs are increased when 
consumers are confused.133
Drawing the line to immunize the use of trademarks as keywords 
only if the third party’s trademark is not displayed in the ad properly 
balances the interests of the trademark holder and of consumers, bene-
fiting all parties affected by the keyword advertising programs. Courts 
benefit because the safe harbor will provide a pre-trial limiting me-
 
  
 131 For criticisms of the unpredictable and instable likelihood of confusion 
analysis, see generally Beebe, supra note 108; Bartow, supra note 108.  
 132 Courts have long recognized a comparative advertising defense as a subset 
of the affirmative defense of classic fair use or nominative fair use. See, e.g., Moseley 
v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 431 (2003) (recognizing that comparative 
advertising falls within the “fair use” doctrine); G.D. Searle & Co. v. Hudson Pharm. 
Corp., 715 F.2d 837, 841 (3d Cir. 1983) (“The use of a competitor’s trademark for 
purposes of comparative advertising is not trademark infringement ‘so long as it does 
not contain misrepresentations or create a reasonable likelihood that purchasers will 
be confused as to the source, identity, or sponsorship of the advertiser’s product.’”) 
(quoting SSP Agric. Equip., Inc. v. Orchard-Rite Ltd., 592 F.2d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 
1979) (citation omitted)). 
 133 See Dogan & Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs, supra 
note 8, at 786-88 (describing how trademarks reduce consumer search costs, but 
noting that trademarks work only if consumers can rely on the accuracy of the marks).  
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chanism that allows for early resolution of a large number of the key-
word advertising cases.134 The trademark holder is ensured that the 
search engine and advertiser are not immunized if his mark is used to 
trigger a competitor’s advertisement in which his mark is displayed—
a practice that would be dangerously likely to confuse consumers. 
This adequately protects his trademark from being deceptively and 
misleadingly used by a competitor without overly restricting the free 
flow of commercial information to consumers. Consumers also bene-
fit in multiple ways because they are protected from the most dange-
rously deceptive type of keyword advertisements, but can still benefit 
from all of the advantages that stem from the less deceptive ads, like 
being able to easily compare competing products and prices. Online 
advertisers benefit by definitively knowing where the line is between 
safe, non-infringing, advertisements and those that may lead to in-
fringement liability. Thus, the advertiser can confidently display non-
deceptive ads, without worrying about potential unpredictable and 
costly litigation over the advertisement. Search engines similarly ben-
efit by the predictability provided by the safe harbor. Search engines 
can confidently continue their advertisement programs without overly 
disabling their effectiveness, thus ensuring that the search engines’ 
have a continuing source of revenue to fund their varied business op-
erations. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the safe harbor en-
sures that the overprotection of trademarks will not unduly interfere 
with the continuing development of efficient search and marketing 
technologies that will ultimately foster a more competitive market and 
further lower consumer search costs.135
Online keyword advertising programs efficiently allow advertisers 
to target potential consumers. Similarly, the programs deliver to con-
sumers a greater supply of relevant commercial information than was 




 134 The safe harbor would likely cause search engines to conform their beha-
vior (i.e., not allowing advertisers to display competitors’ trademarks in their adver-
tisements). For example, Google has already begun to bar the use of third party 
trademarks in AdWords ads in at least some cases. See Gov’t Employees Ins. Co. v. 
Google, No., 2005 WL 1903128, at *1 n. 3. 
 135 See Barrett, supra note 15, at 452; Dogan & Lemley, Trademarks and 
Consumer Search Costs, supra note 8, at 831 (discussing concern that overprotection 
of trademarks in the Internet context has the potential to negatively affect the devel-
opment of efficient search technology and other new methods of advertising that will 
decrease consumer search costs); Goldman, supra note 35, at 509 (“Without limits, 
trademark law has the capacity to counterproductively destroy the Internet’s utility for 
everyone.”). 
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compare competitors’ products and services on any number of charac-
teristics, such as price, style, and quality. The keyword advertising 
programs serve the fundamental normative goal of trademark law 
which is to produce better-informed consumers by fostering the free 
flow of commercial information in markets by protecting against de-
ceptive and inaccurate uses of trade symbols, and thereby reducing 
consumer search costs.136
The keyword advertising programs, however, present a potential 
trademark law problem when the keywords used to trigger advertise-
ments are trademarks owned by third parties. Courts have struggled to 
deal with a number of issues arising out of litigation over advertise-
ments based on trademarks as keywords,
  
137 and scholars have advo-
cated a variety of approaches to resolve these trademark issues with 
the goal of preserving the information-facilitating and search costs 
lowering functions that the keyword advertising programs provide.138 
Each of the proposed solutions is less than optimal for a variety of 
reasons.139 The best solution is for Congress to create a statutory safe 
harbor to immunize search engines and online advertisers from in-
fringement liability for the purchase and sale of trademarks as key-
words that trigger nondeceptive ads, which do not display trademarks 
owned by third parties.140
THOMAS H. WATSON
 By protecting this innocuous, non-deceptive 
type of advertisement, while retaining the possibility of infringement 
liability for more dangerously deceptive advertisements (that display 
another’s trademarks), the safe harbor can ensure that the benefits 
provided to both consumers and advertisers are preserved, while also 
protecting trademark holders from having their marks unfairly abused 
by competitors. The safe harbor properly balances the interests of 
trademark owners and consumers to reduce consumer search costs by 
protecting the integrity of trademarks from the most dangerously de-
ceptive uses, while facilitating the flow of truthful and useful com-
mercial information to consumers by immunizing less deceptive uses. 
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